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1. The Specificity of International Refugee Law 
and Judicial Dialogue
International refugee law governs rules on granting protection to all hu-
man beings who were forced to leave their countries of origin because of  the 
fear of  persecution. As such it governs predominantly the  States’ obligations 
towards those in need and formulates human rights obligations. Yet, one should 
not overlook that the origins of  international refugee law are of totally differ-
ent character – they were shaped, starting from the beginning of the twentieth 
century, as legal instruments aimed at facilitating States to deal with migration 
flows. Indeed, migration flows, including these of mass character, are perma-
nently present in international relations and may significantly disturb the func-
tioning of  particular States and  the international society as a  whole. Thus, 
the existence of a relevant international legal framework appeared to be a must 
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– above all from the perspective of States’ interests. It is only after World War II 
and in the context of the development of international human rights protection 
system that international refugee law turned to be human rights oriented. Nev-
ertheless, States’ interests left their unequivocal imprints on the modern inter-
national refugee law.
The turning point for the modern international law was the adoption in 1951 
of  the Geneva Convention relating to the  Refugee Status (1951 Geneva Con-
vention),1 which was subsequently amended by the 1967 New York Protocol.2 
The 1951 Geneva Convention introduced in  its famous Art. 1A the definition 
of  the term ‘refugee’ and  the 1967 New York Protocol lifted the  relevant time 
and  geographical limitations to the  definition,3 which made it truly universal 
in  its application. Since then the  definition of  the term ‘refugee’ has become 
widely accepted and introduced into national legal systems. Thus the 1951 Ge-
neva Convention refugee definition forms nowadays the basis for legal frame-
works of national refugee regulations as well as for regional refugee regulations 
such as the  Common European Asylum System created within the  European 
Union (EU).
Article 1A of the 1951 Geneva Convention states that the term ‘refugee’ should 
apply to any person who
owing to well-founded fear of  being persecuted for reasons of  race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.
Thus, it is crystal clear from the very wording of the definition that it is open to 
interpretations that may vary. Indeed, the adopted understandings of the term per-
secution or of each of the five persecution grounds alter the scope of the definition. 
The same applies to other aspects of the definition and its application, especially as 
the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol are silent on con-
ditions for the refugee status determination procedure and in fact do not state any 
clear legal obligation to grant refugee status. Instead, the prohibition of refoulment 
1 Convention Relating to the  Status of  Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 
22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (1951 Geneva Convention). As for 16 February 2016 there were 
145 States-parties to the 1951 Geneva Convention.
2 Protocol Relating to the  Status of  Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 
4  October 1967) 606 UNTS 267 (New York Protocol). As for 16 February 2016 there were 
146 States-parties to the 1967 New York Protocol.
3 Note, however, that the geographical limitations existing prior to the adoption of the 1967 
New York Protocol may apply further with the significant example of Turkey, which applies 
the refugee definition to persons coming from Europe only.
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was foreseen in  Art.  33(1) of  the 1951 Geneva Convention, which provides for 
the prohibition of expulsion or return of a refugee “to the frontiers of territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Thus, 
the  international legal framework of  refugee protection remains within the  sig-
nificantly discretional right to grant asylum from persecution and the obligation 
to refrain from refoulement. Concepts such as the internal protection (flight) al-
ternative, the save third country or the first country of asylum are – in their legal 
ambiguity – telling examples in this respect.
The above-mentioned characteristics of  international refugee law should be 
analysed against the  background of  two important features. Firstly, there is  no 
specific international court to apply international refugee law. Although the 1951 
Geneva Convention provides in Art. 38 the judicial clause under which any dis-
pute between the States-parties relating to its interpretation or application is  to 
be referred to the International Court of Justice, this provision has never been so 
far applied. It is not surprising, as applying international refugee law is predom-
inantly about granting or refusing protection to those in need and States persis-
tently tended to secure their discretion in this respect. Yet, one has to remember 
about an enormously important role of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), which was set up in 1950. Since then – and apart from of-
fering factual protection to those replaced – the UNHCR has been shaping the in-
ternational legal framework of refugee protection. It does so with a help of soft 
law measures, such as the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determin-
ing Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees4 as well as other UNHCR’s numerous documents includ-
ing guidelines and comments. Although non-binding, they significantly influence 
the States’ practice and they remain the principal reference points on international 
refugee law.
The other aspect that should be mentioned is  strictly linked with the  first 
one, i.e. the crucial role of national determination authorities including nation-
al courts for the interpretation of international refugee law. Indeed, the national 
courts interpret and apply international refugee law and, in consequence, influ-
ence its development as they form States’ treaty practice under the 1951 Gene-
va Convention and  the 1967 New York Protocol. They may also contribute to 
the creation of parallel customary norms. This results in a tendency of national 
courts to refer to foreign courts’ decisions. This kind of judicial dialogue (in its 
broadest understanding) is stimulated by the characteristics of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention as a  treaty of a particular kind. A. Tzanakopoulos identifies three 
main characteristics that make “certain treaties particularly likely to become 
4 UNHCR, ‘Handbook on Procedures and  Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’ (Geneva 1992, 
reedited).
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the  subject of  judicial dialogue.”5 The  first is  the subject of  the treaty as “the 
treaties dealing with issues that most States are  likely to encounter in day-to-
day domestic administration are of obvious importance to domestic courts: they 
are likely to be invoked in domestic court proceedings.”6 The 1951 Geneva Con-
vention is explicitly mentioned by Tzanakopoulos in this context as ‘the prime 
example’.7 The  other two characteristics identified are  the discretional nature 
of  a  treaty and  the multilateral character of  a  treaty.8 Indeed, given the previ-
ous observations, the 1951 Geneva Convention – although this time not labeled 
as such by Tzanakopoulos – may well aspire to the ‘prime example’ status also 
in these two regards.
National courts’ refugee law references to the case law of foreign jurisdictions 
seem to be more developed in the common law systems.9 Despite the common 
legal tradition that undoubtedly makes such references more natural, the  lan-
guage aspect seems to be a  practical and  a  very helpful facilitator, as English 
is  the common language of  most common law systems.10 Obviously, national 
courts’ references to the case law of foreign jurisdictions take place also in civ-
il law systems with frequent references to common law jurisdictions.11 Again, 
the status of English as the modern lingua franca is not to be underestimated. 
It  is especially so, as the  UNHCR has been always involved in  promoting in-
terpretative ‘good practices’ of national courts by making them available in its 
publications. The process has been fundamentally facilitated since the beginning 
of the Internet era.
In Central and  Eastern Europe (the CEE) international refugee law has be-
come the  issue only since the  turn of  the 1980s and  the 1990s. It was then, i.e. 
after the end of the Cold War era and after the democratization of the region, that 
the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York stopped to be perceived, as it 
previously used to be in the Soviet bloc, as instruments of the ‘imperialistic West’. 
The CEE States consecutively acceded the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 
5 A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘Judicial Dialogue as Means of Interpretation’, [in:] H. Aust, G. Nolte (eds), 
The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts: Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence 




9 F. Cafaggi et al., Judicial Interactions Techniques – Their Potential and Use in European Funda-
mental Rights Adjudication (European University Institute 2014), p. 40.
10 Hélène Lambert points out that “the British courts (including the Scottish Court of Session) 
have often explicitly referred to common law jurisprudence in asylum cases, in particular to 
decisions from Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the USA when interpreting certain pro-
visions of the Refugee Convention”, H. Lambert, ‘Transnational Judicial Dialogue, Harmoni-
zation and the Common European Asylum System’ (2009) 58 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 529 with references.
11 See e.g.: E. Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and Interna-
tional Law by National Courts’ (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law, p. 262 with 
references.
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New York Protocol12 and introduced the refugee definition to their national legis-
lations. The process was gradual. In Poland, for instance, the first comprehensive 
legislative regulation on granting international protection to foreigners was adopt-
ed in 1997 only. The process could be slow as the CEE States were definitely not 
the major destination countries for asylum-seekers at that time. Also, the UNHCR 
played an active role in supporting the CEE States in creation of national legislative 
and institutional refugee legal framework. In the context of professional training 
offered by the UNHCR, references to the case law of foreign jurisdictions regarding 
the interpretation of the refugee definition or the application of the non-refoule-
ment principle were self-evident. Again, the fact that the most accessible and illus-
trative materials were available in English played an important role in the process.
Nevertheless, two additional aspects gradually grew to influence the develop-
ment of national refugee laws in the CEE States. The first was the increasing role 
of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR), which since the late 1990s 
and  the early 2000s has been perceived as the de facto asylum court. The other 
aspect was the accession process to the EU, which coincided with the  intensive 
development of the EU migration and asylum policy. Both aspects were so com-
prehensive and of such significance that it seems justifiable to speak of the Euro-
peanization of international refugee law.
2. The Europeanization of International Refugee 
Law and Judicial Dialogue
According to some doctrinal opinions, until the  mid-eighties of  the twenti-
eth century, i.e. until the  Member States of  the then European Communities 
took the  first inter-governmental actions aimed at forming common migration 
and  asylum policies, the  European asylum policy had not existed at all.13 Such 
an approach seems to underestimate the earlier activities of  the Council of Eu-
rope, which had been persistently promoting liberal standards of refugee protec-
tion with both legally binding and non-binding measures. One must admit, nev-
ertheless, that the actual influence of these strivings was rather limited. The role 
of the Council of Europe in shaping the European standards of refugee protection 
12 The 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol were simultaneously acceded 
by, e.g., Hungary on 14 March 1989; Poland on 27 September 1991; then Czechoslovakia on 
26 November 1991 (after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
became States-parties to the Convention and the Protocol on 11 May 1993 and 4 February 
1993, respectively). The Baltic States acceded the Convention and the Protocol in 1997 only 
(Estonia on 10 April 1997, Lithuania on 28 April 1997 and Latvia on 31 July 1997).
13 D. Joly, Heaven or Hell?: Asylum Policies and Refugees in Europe (Macmillan Press 1996), p. 44.
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has further diminished since the  inception and subsequent evolution of  the EU 
migration and asylum policies. This is no doubt correct, save for one important 
exception, i.e. the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR) and the 
related jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court.
It must be emphasized that neither the  ECHR, nor its additional protocols 
provide for the  right to asylum. However, it cannot be contested that human 
rights protection standards developed under the ECHR by the ECtHR apply also 
to asylum-seekers within the jurisdiction of the States-parties and form relevant 
and effective guarantees. The respective case law of the ECtHR has been develop-
ing since the 1990s. Article 3 ECHR is definitely of the greatest importance in this 
respect. Its interpretation (intensively developed by the ECtHR since the famous 
1989 Soering case14) introducing the prohibition of extradition, expulsion or re-
turn that might result in torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
established the  standard of protection reaching far beyond the non-refoulment 
principle, as provided for in Art. 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention. The stand-
ard developed under Art. 3 ECHR as well as other international human rights 
guarantees prohibiting torture contributed to the development of the non-refoul-
ment principle as a  customary international norm which – as may be claimed 
–  has nowadays a  significantly wider scope than its treaty equivalent encom-
passed in the 1951 Geneva Convention and, as such, may be attributed the per-
emptory character.15
The protection guaranteed to asylum-seekers under Art. 3 ECHR illustrated 
very well that the  limitation of  the 1951 Geneva Convention personal scope 
of application excluding individuals who, though not falling within the defi-
nition of a ‘refugee’ were in a real need of international protection. The ECHR 
guarantees contributed indirectly to the establishment of the new forms of in-
ternational protection: the subsidiary protection and the temporary protection. 
Additionally, the protection of asylum-seekers granted under Art. 3 ECHR in-
fluenced the European States’ interpretation of  the notion of  refugee as pro-
vided for in Art. 1A of  the 1951 Geneva Convention. It  is clearly visible, for 
instance, in  cases where the  persecution is  suffered from the  hands of  non-
State actors.
The guarantees granted under Art. 3 ECHR must be also taken into account as 
far as the mechanisms of determining the State responsible for examining the ap-
plications for asylum lodged in one of the EU Member States. The ECtHR claimed 
so already in  the 2000 T.I. decision16 in relation to the United Kingdom obliga-
tions under Art. 3 ECHR in connection with its obligations under the 1990 Dublin 
14 Soering v the UK, App. no. 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989).
15 G.S. Goodwin-Gill, J. McAdam, The  Refugee in  International Law (3rd ed., Oxford University 
Press 2007), p. 201 and 345.
16 T.I. v the UK, App. no. 43844/98 (ECtHR, inadmissibility decision, 7 March 2000).
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Convention.17 The relevant case law has been subsequently evolving in relation to 
the EU Dublin II Regulation with the significant examples of the well-known cases 
of M.S.S.18 and Tarakhel.19
Moreover, the obligations of the ECHR States-parties towards asylum-seekers 
must be also taken into account in the context of procedural guarantees directly or 
indirectly linked with the asylum procedure. It is so in relation to the asylum-seek-
ers detention standards (Art. 5 ECHR), as well as in relation to the right to effective 
remedy in the cases of: firstly, potential expulsion or return that might result in vi-
olation of Art. 3 ECHR (Art. 13 in conjunction with Art. 3 ECHR); secondly, deni-
al of family reunification (Art. 13 in conjunction with Art. 8 ECHR); and thirdly, 
decision on detention (Art. 5.4 ECHR). What is more, Art. 3 ECHR may also apply 
to the conditions of the asylum-seeker detention.
Thus, although the ECtHR does not interpret neither the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention, nor the 1967 New York Protocol, the significance of the ECHR for asy-
lum-seekers’ protection remains obvious. One can even refer to the  doctrinal 
opinion that under the ECHR – and especially under its Art. 3 – it is justifiable 
to speak of the implied right to de facto asylum.20 Interesting enough, the opinion 
submitted already in 1990, i.e. at the time when the asylum case law of the ECtHR 
was yet in statu nascendi. However, from the present day perspective it is obvious 
that the  modern European asylum legal framework has been decisively shaped 
in the context of measures developed by the EU Member States.
The standards developed by the EU Member States regionally complement reg-
ulations of the universal international refugee law based on the 1951 Geneva Con-
vention and the 1967 New York Protocol. The Common European Asylum System 
(the CEAS), established within the EU and consisting of a set of asylum directives 
and regulations, is  explicitly based – as provided in  the primary EU law21 – on 
these international agreements as its cornerstones. Yet, the EU regional standards 
17 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged 
in one of the Member States of the European Communities and measures for its implemen-
tation (the Dublin Convention) (1997) O.J. C 254/1. The 1990 Dublin Convention entered into 
force on 1 September 1997. After the  communitarisation of  the EU migration and  asylum 
policies under the Amsterdam Treaty the Dublin II Regulation was adopted in 2003 (Council 
Regulation 343/2003/EC of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for de-
termining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one 
of the Member States by a third-country national (2003) O.J. L 50/1) and was subsequently 
replaced by its recast version of 2013 known as Dublin III Regulation (Regulation 604/2013/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria 
and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national 
or a stateless person (recast) (2013) O.J. L 180/31).
18 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, App. no. 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2012).
19 Tarakhel v Switzerland, App. no. 29217/12 (ECtHR, 4 November 2012).
20 T. Einarsen, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Notion of an Implied Right 
to de facto Asylum’ (1990) 2 International Journal of Refugee Law 361.
21 Art. 78.1 TFEU and Art. 18 CFR.
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are significantly innovative and as such they have been influencing – at least to 
some extent – the universal ones. It is so with, e.g., the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining a State responsible for examining an asylum application; the tem-
porary protection regime; establishing the legal framework of the subsidiary (to 
the refugee status) protection; interpreting the refugee definition in  the context 
of internal protection (flight) alternative, gender or sexual orientation related per-
secution. What is more, the CEAS legal measures have been placed under the ju-
risdiction of  the Court of  Justice of  the EU (the CJEU; formerly the  European 
Court of Justice) and since then its asylum case law has become significant and, 
at least to some extent, has contributed to the mentioned standards’ development. 
The CJEU interprets the EU secondary asylum legislation and in consequence, as 
it is legally based on the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Proto-
col, it interprets the provisions of the latter instruments as well.22 Indeed, as Roland 
Bank puts it:
the supranational setting of the [EU] law provides a framework of  law that is much more 
powerful than the usual interplay between international and national law. It directly impacts 
on the national asylum systems by establishing, interpreting and, to a certain extent, enforc-
ing binding rules in the application of EU law by EU [M]ember [S]tates that would have to be 
measured by the 1951 [Geneva] Convention and its 1967 [New York] Protocol.23
In the view of the above, it is apparent that asylum cases that are to be adjudicat-
ed on national level in the EU Member States demand references to international, 
supranational and national legal sources that coincide and interact. Thus, the judi-
cial dialogue on refugee law dialogue becomes even more important. What is more, 
the complex relation of EU law and the ECHR, as well as the relevant status of the 
latter under the former must also be taken into account. It  is especially the case 
since the CJEU refers in its case law to legal issues covered also by the ECtHR case 
law and this results in the European judicial dialogue par excellence.
22 R. Bank, ‘The Potential and Limitations of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Shap-
ing International Refugee Law’ (2015) 27 International Journal of Refugee Law 2 220. Roland 
Bank notes that in fact “[r]egarding the 1951 [Geneva] Convention, the CJEU is the first inter-
national court to pronounce itself on questions arising in its application” (ibidem, 241). Yet, 
the quoted author is rather critical of the CJEU’s role in this respect so far (passim).
23 Ibidem, 214.
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3. International Refugee Law and Judicial 
Dialogue, Conversation or Interaction?
The understanding of judicial dialogue as adopted by the editors of this vol-
ume comprises every reference in a national court’s decision either to a decision 
of  another national court of  foreign jurisdiction or to an international court’s 
decision. It  seems, however, that while dealing with international refugee law 
a broader perspective on judicial dialogue may be useful or even indispensable. 
At least, this seems to be the case in Europe in the context of the described Euro-
peanization of international refugee law. The two regional international courts, 
i.e. the  ECtHR and  the CJEU, although not asylum courts per se, dominated, 
in  fact, the  interpretation and  application of  international refugee law in  Eu-
rope. Consequently, they have formally or informally influenced national asylum 
courts’ case laws. What is more, both European courts could not have escaped 
entering into a  dialogue on asylum matters with each other. Therefore, as far 
as the European judicial dialogue in asylum matters is concerned, four possible 
scenarios can be distinguished:
1) a national court refers in its decision to a decision of an international court;
2) a  national court refers in  its decision to a  decision of  another national 
court of foreign jurisdiction;
3) an international court refers in its decision to a decision of a national court;
4) an international court refers in its decision to a decision of another interna-
tional court.
In asylum cases all situations mentioned above may take place, yet with vari-
ous intensity. Without entering into a detailed analysis at this stage, it seems ap-
propriate to claim that in the European context the situations listed under points 
one and four should be frequent as they are legally indispensable, whereas the sit-
uations listed under points two and three seem to be possible, yet far less obvi-
ous, and as such rather rare. Indeed, the first listed situation will take place in the 
context of safeguarding the ECHR guarantees to asylum-seekers under the juris-
diction of the States-parties and, as far as the relevant EU Member States are con-
cerned, in the context of the EU preliminary ruling procedure. The situation list-
ed under point four will result, firstly, from the fact that both European courts 
are  obliged to address the  same or overlapping legal issues on asylum matters. 
Also, the ECHR status under EU law will be an additional factor in this respect. 
Indeed, the national asylum courts in the EU Member States may be placed in an 
uncomfortable position while confronted with not necessarily coherent pro-
nouncements of the ECtHR and the CJEU. Examples will follow in the subsequent 
part of the present text. 
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The second of the mentioned situation is possible, as national courts will ap-
ply the same international legal norms: first of all, the refugee definition under 
the 1951 Geneva Convention. Yet, the reference to the case law may concern many 
other legal issues (also under EU law as implemented by the EU Member States) 
as well as factual findings. A foreign court’s decision, if appropriately current, may 
be a valuable source on a country of origin information. Lastly, the situation men-
tioned under point three above may also take place with the relevant procedures 
before the international courts. The attempt to establish the European consensus 
by the ECtHR as the ECHR interpretation method may serve as a good example.
Before entering into a  contextualized analysis of  the above mentioned sce-
narios one should note that they may significantly vary in  their character, too. 
Therefore, a  more differentiated approach to the  character of  relations among 
asylum courts may appear helpful. Indeed, “academics use different terms for re-
ferring to the different forms of exchanges that occur between judges and courts 
around the globe. The  term ‘dialogue’ has so far been the most common term 
used by legal academia to refer to this phenomenon, in addition, terms such as 
‘transnational judicial dialogue’, ‘conversation’, and ‘judicial interaction’ have also 
been employed.”24 Vast literature has been devoted to the analysis and characteri-
zations of these exchanges in different contexts.25 Risking generalization, one may 
state that judicial dialogue “entails an ongoing exchange of arguments in order to 
reach common understandings. Thus, dialogue requires some sort of reciprocity 
among the judicial actors involved and it develops on a case by case basis over 
time.”26 The other categories are of broader character, consist of more actors in-
volved and  include more informal relations among courts. O. Frishman points 
to three main forms of  courts’ interactions: face-to-face interactions, IT-based 
communication and cross-citations.27 The  latter is  to be equated with the  judi-
cial dialogue in the sense referred to above: “a way for courts to exchange their 
understanding of  the best legal solution to a  certain problem.”28 However, one 
should not underestimate the two former ways of courts’ interactions. They re-
main less formal, yet they may turn out to be very influential. International Refu-
gee Law is a very illustrative example in this respect. The refugee judges networks 
and associations such as the influential International Association of Refugee Law 
Judges29 provide – through conferences, workshops, trainings, projects etc. – for 
actual face-to-face contacts which may prove to be very helpful in achieving har-
monized approaches to particular legal problems. Again, in the EU context pro-
24 F. Cafaggi et al. (n. 10), p. 38, references omitted.
25 See e.g.: ibidem, 38–40 with extensive doctrinal references.
26 Ibidem, p. 39, references omitted.
27 O. Frishman, ‘Transnational Judicial Dialogue as an Organisation Field’ (2013) 19 European 
Law Journal, p. 747.
28 Ibidem, p.  748.
29 Established in 1995 and consisting of regional Chapters. See the Association’s Internet site at 
<www.iarlj.org> (access: 30 April 2016).
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fessional trainings for judges organized by the European Asylum Support Office 
within its Judges’ Network fulfill a similar function. Obviously, this kind of inter-
action is strictly linked to an IT-based communication. In addition, professional 
asylum resources offered by different entities and accessible online are of high 
importance. The UNHCR remains the most influential actor in this respect with 
its ‘refworld’ asylum resources portal.30
4. The Judicial Dialogue on Refugee Law 
in the Polish Context
4.1. Introductory Remarks
In the following section the contextualised instances of a judicial dialogue in the 
Polish practice of granting international protection to foreigners will be analysed. 
Of prime importance is the refugee status determination procedure that is initi-
ated by an application for international protection and which, under the national 
law, consists of the determination of grounds for granting refugee status as well 
as of grounds for subsidiary protection.31 The Head of the Office for Foreigners 
(Szef Urzędu do Spraw Cudzoziemców) as the first instance and the Refugee Board 
(Rada do Spraw Uchodźców) as the appeal instance are the competent authorities 
in this context. A Refugee Board decision may be appealed to an administrative 
court. The  judicial administrative procedure consists of  two instances. The first 
instance is  the Warsaw Administrative Court (Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny 
w Warszawie) and its judgements may be appealed (a cassation appeal) to the Su-
preme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny). The present anal-
ysis will focus on the case law of the Polish administrative courts. Nevertheless, 
the case law of  the Refugee Board will be taken into account, too. The Refugee 
30 See at: Refworld database <www.refworld.org> (access: 30 April 2016).
31 The procedure obliging a foreigner to return (the return procedure) bears separate charac-
teristics and is now regulated under the Foreigners’ Act of 12 December 2013. Within the re-
turn procedure two other forms of protection may be granted to a foreigner, i.e. the permit 
to remain for humanitarian reasons (the humanitarian permit) and the permit for tolerat-
ed stay (the tolerated stay permit). One of the premises to grant the humanitarian permit 
is the right to respect for private and family life within the meaning of Art. 8 ECHR. Until 1 
May 2014 this aspect was taken into account within the refugee status determination pro-
cedure under the premises for granting the then tolerated stay permit (at that time the tol-
erated stay permit was the third form of granting protection to foreigners, if refugee status 
and subsidiary protection were refused and granting the then tolerated stay permit exclud-
ed expulsion decision).
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Board is a twelve-member body divided into four adjudicating panels (some deci-
sions may be taken also by a single member of the Refugee Board). The members 
of the Refugee Board are independent and bound by the law only. Yet, the qua-
si-judicial character of the Refugee Board may be challenged as the Refugee Board 
does not settle a  dispute between the  parties but reconsiders an administrative 
case instead. Thus the Refugee Board does not exercise a purely judicial function. 
It is not clear whether the Refugee Board is covered by the concept of ‘a court or 
a tribunal’ under EU law. The Refugee Board has not tried to submit a reference 
for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU so far. Regardless of this fact, it may be noted 
that no Polish administrative court submitted a reference for a preliminary ruling 
referring on refugee law issue so far either.
The analysis will focus on relations between the courts that were listed in sec-
tion 3 above under points one and two, i.e. in situations in which a national court 
refers in its decision to a decision of an international court or to a decision of an-
other national court of foreign jurisdiction. The judicial dialogue between inter-
national courts and its significance for a national judge (adjudicator) will be also 
taken into account.
The analysis is divided into four subsections. Firstly, the general characteris-
tics of the analysed references making up the refugee law judicial dialogue will be 
presented (4.2). Subsequently, the three selected particular issues will be analysed: 
the question regarding the understanding of the social group concept under the ref-
ugee definition (4.3); the application of the internal protection (flight) alternative 
principle (4.4); and the question of denial of access to adequate medical treatment 
in a country of origin as a ground for granting subsidiary protection (4.5).
4.2. The General Characteristics of the Polish Contribution 
to the Judicial Dialogue on Refugee Law
The conducted case law analysis shows that references to decisions of interna-
tional courts and of national courts of foreign jurisdictions are not at all frequent. 
It  is so especially in  the second case. This flows from the  fact that accessibility 
of  such decisions is  highly limited. The  other major obstacle is  the specificity 
of national regulations of, both, substantive and procedural nature.
In this context it is not surprising that the rare, identified examples of referenc-
es to national courts’ decisions do not regard legal questions but factual determi-
nations of situations in the country of origin concerned. An illustrative example 
of such a reference is the decision of the Refugee Board32 in which the reference 
is made to the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority’s decision33 in or-
der to invoke the same assessment that Sikhs who live in India outside the Pun-
32 Case RdU-93-1/S/14 (Refugee Board, 29 May 2014). All the Refugee Board decisions referred 
to in the present text are unpublished and on file with the author.
33 Refugee Appeal 76456 (New Zealand: Refugee Status Appeals Authority, 15 March 2010).
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jab territory enjoy the same social and economic rights as other Indian nationals 
and that discrimination they might experience in this respect cannot be classified 
as persecution.
Of similar character was the reference in the 2003 Supreme Administrative 
Court judgement.34 The  case concerned an applicant from Nigeria, who left 
the country of origin due to the declared threat from the Ogboni society. In his 
appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court the applicant referred to national 
decisions from Australia and  Canada in  which cases based on the  same facts 
were adjudicated positively for the  applicants. In  its judgement the  Supreme 
Administrative Court quashed the  appealed decision of  the Refugee Board 
(the  judgement was delivered in  the framework of  the single judicial admin-
istrative procedure binding at that time) because of deficiencies in evidentiary 
procedure and stated that the circumstances regarding the threat from the Og-
boni society in Nigeria must be clarified in more detail. Yet, the Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court made a  reference to the  UK court’s judgement in  which it 
considered the threat from the Ogboni society in Nigeria and decided the case 
negatively for the applicant.35
Another brief reference to the UK court’s decision was identified in the 2015 
Administrative Court’s judgement.36 The Court approvingly referred to the Refu-
gee Board’s findings on the identification of the groups in high risk of persecution 
in Iran, which were based on the expert opinions and the identical findings in the 
UK court judgment.37
It is characteristic for all of the above examples that references were made to 
the decisions of courts from English speaking States only. They were all written 
in English and made accessible online in the open access refugee law databas-
es. It  is also characteristic that all references were of very laconic and general 
character.
The references to a foreign national court’s decision regarding legal questions 
are even less frequent. In  fact, only one such decision has been identified. This 
is the 2008 Supreme Administrative Court judgement.38 There the Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court referred to the interpretation of the concept of a social group 
as a reason for persecution on gender grounds within the definition of a refugee 
34 Case V SA 1494/02 (Supreme Administrative Court, 29 January 2003). All the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court and the Regional Administrative Courts judgements referred to in the present 
text are available via Centralna Baza Orzeczeń Sądów Administracyjnych (Central Administra-
tive Courts’ Decisions Database) at <http://orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl/cbo/query> (access: 30 April 
2016).
35 Omoruyi v  Secretary of  State for the  Home Department Imm AR 175 (Appellate Court Civ-
il Division, 2001) available via The  University of  Michigan Law School, Refugee Case Law, 
<www.refugeecaselaw.org> (access: 30 April 2016).
36 Case IV SA/Wa 2152/14 (Warsaw Administrative Court, 22 January 2015).
37 S.B. Iran v  Secretary of  State for the  Home Department (no source reference included 
in the Warsaw Administrative Court’s judgement).
38 Case II OSK 237/07 (Supreme Administrative Court, 8 May 2008).
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under Art. 1A of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Such concept of a social group was 
used in national decisions in Canada, the US and the UK. The Supreme Admin-
istrative Court judgement will be analysed in more detail in subsection 4.3 below.
The Polish administrative courts’ and  the Refugee Board’s references to 
the ECtHR and CJEU case law on refugee law are definitely more frequent. For 
the ECtHR case law, this was particularly frequent before the 1 May 2014 major 
amendment of  2003 Act on granting protection to foreigners on the  territory 
of the Republic of Poland. Before that amendment the refugee status determina-
tion procedure covered also the phase of determination of grounds for the tol-
erated stay permit, i.e. the  auxiliary form of  protection granted to foreigners 
in Poland. The statutory grounds for the tolerated stay permit included, among 
others, violations of selected guarantees of the ECHR as far as they excluded ex-
pulsion of a foreigner. Thus, references to law of the ECHR as established in the 
case law of the ECHR determining the scope of the particular ECHR standards 
were, in fact, of mandatory character. The references were made mainly to de-
cisions against other States-parties to the ECHR as there were no Polish cases 
concerning expulsions in such context. Particularly frequent were references to 
standards established by the  ECtHR under Art.  8 ECHR, which excluded ex-
pulsion on the basis of the right to respect for family life. Numerous decisions 
of the Refugee Board may be identified in which the relevant standard was re-
constructed in detail and the application structure of Art. 8 ECHR was used.39 
Yet, the case law of the Refugee Board was diversified and one could also point 
to many decisions in which the relevant considerations on the right to respect 
for family life were not adequate or even fake. In the latter case the references 
to the old cases were made via published compilations of  the ECtHR case law 
extracts. Also, the  case law of  the Polish administrative courts in  the present 
context is quite broad and includes examples of references to the case law of the 
ECtHR and the CJEU.40
As far as the tolerated stay permit is concerned, one decision of the Refugee 
Board is particularly worth mentioning. This is the 2009 decision on granting 
the tolerated stay permit to a Chechen fighter.41 The decision includes exten-
sive references to the  ECtHR case law on Art.  3 ECHR. The  Refugee Board 
firstly referred to numerous judgements of the ECtHR against Russia in order 
to demonstrate that the standard of Art. 3 ECHR had been in Russia consist-
ently and widely violated in many its aspects. Subsequently the Refugee Board 
stated that
according to the  well-established case law of  the ECtHR (starting with the  judgements 
in cases of Soering v the United Kingdom of 7 July 1989, application no. 14038/88; A 161; 
39 See e.g. Refugee Board cases: RdU-1182-1/S/09 (14 January 2010); RdU-161-1/S/12 (28 May 
2012); RdU-72-5/S/08 (14 October 2013).
40 See e.g.: case IV SA/Wa 1387/13 (Warsaw DAC, 15 October 2013).
41 Case RdU-129-4/S/07 (Refugee Board, 3 April 2009).
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the judgement regarded surrendering of a foreign national for extradition; and Cruz Veras 
and  others v  Sweden of  20 March 1991, application no. 15576/89; A  201; the  judgement 
regarded expulsion of a foreign national) both surrendering and expulsion of a foreign na-
tional that would put him or her at risk of treatment prohibited under Art. 3 ECHR results 
in its violation. Thus, the guarantees of Art. 3 ECHR imply the prohibition of surrendering 
as well as of expelling a foreign national to the State in which he or she would be at risk 
of prohibited treatment. The absolute and non-derogable character of  the protection un-
der Art. 3 ECHR implies further that the guarantees resulting from it must not be exclud-
ed in  any circumstances and  notwithstanding any threat from the  individual concerned 
which has been recently confirmed by the ECtHR in the judgement in case of Saadi v Italy 
of 28 February 2008 (application no. 37201/06; see especially para. 124–149 with references 
to earlier case law of the ECtHR).42
The references to the extradition under the ECtHR case law were apparently 
made because of independent extradition proceedings, which were then pending 
simultaneously. The references to the ECtHR case law were of crucial importance 
as it was established that the applicant was at risk of serious violation of human 
rights in the country of origin, including the risk of torture. Granting of the refu-
gee status was excluded, as was granting subsidiary protection, because the appli-
cant was sentenced for criminal offence already while in Poland and the relevant 
security authorities issued a document stating that the applicant was a threat to 
the public security and order. Yet, the latter was not the premise for refusal to grant 
the tolerated stay permit. The then binding law was, however, not fully coherent 
and the threat to the public security and order constituted a premise for withdraw-
al of the permit. Nevertheless, the Refugee Board granted the tolerated stay permit 
to the applicant and underlined that absolute character of the protection resulting 
from Art. 3 ECHR and stated that:
according to the principle of subsidiarity being the basis of the ECHR (Art. 1) it is the na-
tional authorities of the States-parties to the ECHR that are predominantly responsible for 
safeguarding the conventional guarantees. The ECHR forms part of the domestic legal order 
42 “Zgodnie z  ustalonym orzecznictwem ETrPC (począwszy od  wyroków w  sprawach Soering 
przeciwko Zjednoczonemu Królestwu z dnia 7 lipca 1989 r., skarga nr 14038/88; A 161; wyrok 
dotyczył sytuacji przekazania cudzoziemca w trybie ekstradycji; i Cruz Veras i inni przeciwko 
Szwecji z dnia 20 marca 1991 r. (skarga nr 15576/89; A 201; wyrok dotyczył sytuacji wydale-
nia cudzoziemca) tak przekazanie, jak i wydalenie cudzoziemca, które skutkowałoby naraże-
niem go na traktowanie zabronione w art. 3 EKPC, prowadzi do jego naruszenia. Gwarancje 
art. 3 EKPC implikują więc zakaz tak przekazania, jak i wydalenia cudzoziemca do państwa, 
w którym byłby narażony na zabronione traktowanie. Absolutny i niederogowalny charakter 
ochrony na podstawie art. 3 EKPC implikuje też, że wynikające z niego gwarancje nie mogą 
zostać wyłączone w  żadnych okolicznościach i  niezależnie od  zagrożenia, które jednostka 
może stanowić, co w ostatnim czasie zostało potwierdzone przez ETrPC w wyroku w spra-
wie Saadi przeciwko Włochom z  dnia 28 lutego 2008  r. (skarga 37201/06; zob. zwłaszcza 
par. 124–149 i tam cytowane wcześniejsze orzecznictwo ETrPC)”, ibidem.
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and may be applied directly and according to Art. 91 with conjunction with Art. 241.1 of the 
Constitution of  the Republic of  Poland of  1997 [references omitted] has precedence over 
a regular law if provisions of the latter cannot be reconciled with the ECHR.43
The Warsaw Regional Prosecutor appealed the Refugee Board decision, which 
constituted the only case of  such appeal since the establishment of  the Refugee 
Board in 1999. The Warsaw Administrative Court in  its judgment of 4 Decem-
ber 2009 dismissed the appeal and fully shared the argumentation of the Refugee 
Board’s reasoning.44
As far as grounds for granting refugee status as well as for granting subsidi-
ary protection are concerned, the references to the case law of the ECtHR appear 
in contexts, which will be subject to a separate analysis in subsections 4.3–4.2 be-
low.
As mentioned above, so far no Polish administrative court has referred a ques-
tion regarding refugee law issues to the  CJEU. Nevertheless, the  significance 
of the CJEU case law for the interpretation of the EU asylum acquis has been, as 
indicated in section 2, consistently increasing in the recent years. Thus, the inter-
pretative positions of the CJEU must be taken into account also by Polish courts, 
which is the case in practice. Yet, the direct references to particular judgements 
of the CJEU are made both in the case law of administrative courts and that of the 
Refugee Board albeit they are not frequent. They appear, for instance, in cases 
in which an applicant (especially if provided with legal aid) refers to a particular 
judgement within the  framework of  the procedure.45 More importantly, direct 
references also appear if the interpretative position of the CJEU determines par-
ticular decision of a case. It is so, e.g., in cases dealing with the refusal to perform 
military service in an armed conflict as a reason for persecution. In some cases 
the Refugee Board referred directly to the interpretative standard as established 
43 “W  myśl leżącej u  podstaw EKPC zasady subsydiarności (art. 1 EKPC) to na  organach kra-
jowych państw stron EKPC ciąży podstawowy obowiązek zapewnienia przestrzegania gwa-
rancji konwencyjnych. EKPC stanowi część krajowego porządku prawnego i jest stosowana 
bezpośrednio, a zgodnie z art. 91 w związku z art. 241 ust. 1 Konstytucji Rzeczpospolitej Pol-
skiej z 1997 r. (Dz. U. 97.78.483 z późn. zm.) ma pierwszeństwo przed ustawą jeżeli ustawy nie 
da się pogodzić z EKPC”, ibidem.
44 Case V SA/Wa 874/10 (Warsaw Administrative Court, 4 December 2009). Also the extradition 
proceedings ended up with a court’s decision prohibiting the extradition. All that resulted 
in discontinuation of the proceedings before the ECtHR; Mamilov v Poland, App. no. 18358/07 
(ECHR, inadmissibility decision/striking out of the list of cases, 20 October 2010).
45 See e.g.: case RdU-908-1/S/09 (Refugee Board, 23 October 2009). The Refugee Board pointed 
out that the  representative of  the applicant wrongly referred to the  evidence standard as 
established by the CJEU in the Elgafaji judgement (Case C-465/07, Meki Elgafaji, Noor Elgafaji 
v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, CJEU, 17 February 2009) because the case under considera-
tion before the Refugee Board regarded the country of origin (Republic of Guinea) where nei-
ther international armed conflict nor non-international armed conflict within the meaning 
of Art. 15(c) of the 2004 Qualification Directive had been pending at the time.
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by the CJEU in Shepherd.46 Other examples are cases dealing with the question 
of  denial of  access to adequate medical treatment in  the country of  origin as 
a  ground for granting subsidiary protection. In  some cases the  Refugee Board 
as well as a  regional administrative court referred directly to the  interpretative 
position of  the CJEU in  M’Bodj.47 The  latter question will be dealt with more 
broadly in subsection 4.5.
Other interesting examples are  decisions of  the Refugee Board regarding 
applicants seeking refugee status because of the danger of persecution based on 
sexual orientation. Indeed, asylum claims related to sexual orientation and gen-
der identity have become broadly discussed in  the recent years and  resulted 
in a real European judicial dialogue between the CJEU48 and the ECtHR49 with 
some important contributions from national courts.50 There were also a  few 
such cases decided by the Polish authorities, yet this happened before the de-
livery of the CJEU judgements. It is worth stressing that decisions of the Ref-
ugee Board appeared to be consistent with subsequent interpretative positions 
of  the CJEU and  to some extent they were even significantly more liberal.51 
The Refugee Board stated, among others, that the very penalization of a ho-
mosexual act in a country of origin amounted to an act of persecution unless 
it may be demonstrated that a relevant law is not at all applied in practice. Also, 
the Refugee Board stated clearly that there are no objective methods allowing 
for definite medical assessment of  one’s sexual orientation and  consequent-
ly they must not be applied in  the refugee status determination procedure. 
According to the  Refugee Board position, the  sexual orientation should be 
determined upon an applicant’s declaration, yet it requires verification of his 
46 Case C-472/13, Andre Lawrence Shepherd v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (CJEU, 26 February 
2015). See e.g.: the following decisions of the Refugee Board, which all regarded the Ukrain-
ian applicants and  all included identical references to paragraphs 47–56 of  the Shepherd 
judgement: RdU-746-1/S/15 (3 September 2015); RdU-794-1/S/15 (3 September 2015); 
RdU-780-1/S/15 (30 September 2015); RdU-1050-1/S/15 (9 November 2015).
47 Case C-542/13, Mohamed M’Bodj v État belge (CJEU, 18 December 2014).
48 CJEU cases: C-199/12–C-201/127, X, Y and  Z  v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel (7 November 
2013); C-148/13–C-150/13, A, B, C v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (2 December 2014).
49 Recent ECtHR cases: M.E. v Sweden, App. no. 713398/12 (Chamber, 26 June 2014), M.E. v Swe-
den, App. no. 713398/12 (Grand Chamber, 8 April 2015). See also ECtHR cases: F. v the UK, 
App. no. 17341/03 (inadmissibility decision, 22 June 2004) and  I.I.N. v  the  Netherlands, 
App. no. 2035/04 (inadmissibility decision, 9 December 2004).
50 See: HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court, 7 July 2010), para. 82. For commentary see: J. Weßels, ‘HJ (Iran) 
and HT (Cameroon) – Reflections on a new test for sexuality-based asylum claims in Britain’ 
(2012) 24 International Journal of Refugee Law, p. 815.
51 For the extensive analysis see: M. Kowalski, ‘Sexuelle Orientierung im Flüchtlingsrecht und 
im allgemeinen Migrationsrecht Polens unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Verifizierung-
sproblematik im Verfahren’, [in:] C.D. Classen, R D. ichter, B. Łukańko (eds), ‘Sexuelle Orienti-
erung’ als Diskriminierungsgrund. Regelungsbedarf in Deutschland und Polen? (Mohr Siebeck 
2016), p. 316.
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credibility in general. One of the Refugee Board decisions including the above 
mentioned positions was deemed by the UNHCR as an example of  jurispru-
dential good practice, translated in  extenso into English and  made available 
in the refworld database. 52
4.3. Defining the Concept of a ‘Social Group’
The already mentioned 2008 Supreme Administrative Court judgement de-
serves particular attention here because of  numerous references to a  multitude 
of foreign judgments. It is a rare example of a Polish court referring to decisions 
of national courts of foreign jurisdictions as indicated above in section 3.2 of the 
present text. The Court adjudicated on the question of a membership in a par-
ticular social group as a reason of persecution due to gender within the context 
of Art. 1A of the 1951 Geneva Convention and it included references to the na-
tional decisions made in Canada, the US and the UK. The Supreme Administrative 
Court judgement is  important indeed, as it is  the first Polish decision declaring 
that women may constitute a particular social group within the meaning of  the 
refugee. The Supreme Administrative Court quashed the appeal judgement of the 
DAC due to, among others, complete ignorance of this aspect in the judgement 
of the first instance and in the decisions of the Head of the Office for Foreigners 
and the Refugee Board.
The Supreme Administrative Court reconstructed the concept of a social group 
starting with the  references to cases of  national courts of  foreign jurisdictions 
and only subsequently referred to the definition of, the then binding, 2004 Qual-
ification Directive. The national cases referred to (nota bene without any source 
references) were the judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada of 5 March 1990 
in Attorney General of Canada v P.F. Ward and the decision of the US Board of Im-
migration Appeals of 1 March 1985 in Acosta-Solorzano v INS – no doubt influ-
enced the scope and the very wording of the definition of a social group as adopted 
in Art. 10(d) of the 2004 Qualification Directive. It reads:
a group shall be considered to form a particular social group where in particular: – mem-
bers of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be 
changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience 
that a person should not be forced to renounce it, and – that group has a distinct identity 
in the relevant country, because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.
Thus, it may be claimed that the  references to national decisions made by 
the Supreme Administrative Court in this respect were only of ornamental char-
acter.
52 Case RdU-178-1/S/12 (Refugee Board, 25 July 2012) unofficial English translation by the UNHCR 
available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5037a3892.html> (access: 30 April 2016).
VII. International Refugee Law and Judicial Dialogue… 383
References made by the Supreme Administrative Court that were definite-
ly of  greater importance regarded national decisions in  which a  particular 
social group was determined on gender grounds. It was so in  the cited case 
concerning a  19-year-old Mexican woman who was the  victim of  domestic 
violence committed by her father. The  Court determined in  this case that 
family should be considered as a particular social group.53 In the case before 
the  Supreme Administrative Court the  appellant was the  Russian national 
coming from Dagestan who claimed that she was a victim of domestic vio-
lence inflicted by her husband. Of crucial importance in this case was the ref-
erence to the well-known and widely commented decision of the UK House 
of  Lords in  Islam and  Shah of  1999.54 The  basis in  the Islam and  Shah case 
was, as the Supreme Administrative Court put it, “determination that a per-
son concerned lived in  a  society stigmatizing women who were perceived 
as behaving against social and cultural norms being binding and widely ac-
cepted in that society.”55 It was suggested in the Islam and Shah case, though 
not directly concerning the  analysis of  the Supreme Administrative Court, 
that alternatively to the determination of recognising all women in Pakistan 
as constituting a particular social group, it was possible to adopt additional 
criteria allowing for narrower definition of a particular social group consist-
ing of women sharing also other common characteristics such as “Pakistani 
women accused of  transgressing social mores and  who are  unprotected by 
their husbands or other male relatives.” The Supreme Administrative Court’s 
position may be perceived as in favour of such approach aimed at recognizing 
certain narrower groups of  women in  a  particular society as a  social group 
within the context of the refugee definition. Yet, the Supreme Administrative 
Court has not elaborated on this issue explicitly and  the issue still remains 
debatable in the recent case law.56
Nevertheless, the Supreme Administrative Court explicitly stated that in case 
of danger of persecution from non-State actors
the condition of the absence of State’s protection must not be understood in every case as 
an unconditioned obligation of  personal exhausting of  the relevant domestic procedures. 
The fact that the appellant has not referred herself to the state authorities for protection does 
53 Aguirre Cervantes v INS (21 March 2001) as accessed via (2001) 13 International Journal of Ref-
ugee Law 586.
54 Islam v  Secretary of  State for the  Home department; R. V. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, 
ex p. Shah (1999) 2 AC 629 (HL).
55 “Stanowiło ustalenie, że strona żyła w  społeczeństwie piętnującym kobiety postrzegane 
jako postępujące w sposób niezgodny ze społecznymi i kulturalnymi normami obowiązują-
cymi i  powszechnie akceptowanymi w  tym społeczeństwie”, case II OSK 237/07 (Supreme 
Administrative Court, 8 May 2008).
56 See especially: case RdU-705-2/S/15 (Refugee Board, 27 April 2016) including the separate 
opinion.
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not have the decisive significance for the dismissal of the refugee status request. Important 
is determining whether the appellant would have obtained protection if she had requested 
for it.57
This position has been strengthened by the  reference to the  Isalm and Shah 
judgment where the  UK House of  Lords determined that in  Pakistan women’s 
charges against their husbands are not only ineffective but may also result in in-
creased danger of them being mistreated.
The analysed Supreme Administrative Court judgement is  an illustrative 
example of  an interpretation of  international law by a  national court. By re-
ferring to other national decisions in the form of cross-citations (in the Islam 
and Shah the UK House of Lords referred to other national cases which were 
referred by the Supreme Administrative Court as well) national courts pursue 
judicial dialogue par excellence (proper judicial dialogue). The  Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court contributed to that dialogue engaging in the discussion with 
the pronouncements of the UK House of Lords. Regrettably, the research car-
ried out in preparation of the present paper shows that this is an isolated ex-
ample. Again, one should remark that all references mentioned are to decisions 
of courts from English speaking States, which are available in open access ref-
ugee law databases.
Moreover, it should be remarked that the commented Supreme Administrative 
Court judgement’s influence on the case law of the Polish refugee status determi-
nation authorities and administrative courts was rather modest. The cases regard-
ing, widely understood, domestic violence against women are decided positively 
for applicants, only if they are found credible. This is a very challenging threshold 
for this kind of cases and the evaluation is carried out not with the view to grant 
refugee status but rather subsidiary protection because of serious harm consisting 
of torture or degrading or inhuman treatment (previously also with the view to 
grant a tolerated stay permit for the same reasons).
The acceptance for recognizing women as constituting a  particular social 
group in a certain country of origin is itself not questioned and that especially 
in the light of the last sentence of Art. 10(d) of the 2011 Qualification Direc-
tive.58 Yet, in the present Polish case law it seems to be understood as limited 
57 “Warunek braku ochrony ze strony państwa nie może być w każdym przypadku rozumiany 
jako bezwzględny obowiązek wyczerpania dostępnych w kraju procedur ochronnych osobi-
ście. Okoliczność, że skarżąca nie zwróciła się do organów państwa o pomoc nie może mieć 
decydującego znaczenia dla uzasadnienia odmowy nadania statusu uchodźcy. Istotne jest 
ustalenie, czy skarżąca otrzymałaby pomoc państwa, gdyby się o nią zwróciła”, case II OSK 
237/07 (Supreme Administrative Court, 8 May 2008).
58 “Gender related aspects, including gender identity, shall be given due consideration for 
the purposes of determining membership of a particular social group or identifying a char-
acteristic of  such a  group.” See also Art.  60 of  the 2011 Council of  Europe Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, CETS No. 210.
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to situations in which it is possible to determine that in a particular country 
of origin every woman is at risk of persecution because of being a woman only. 
Indeed, this is  very restrictive standard as such situations will be very rare 
in practice.
In the context analysed, one may illustratively point out the 2014 Warsaw 
Administrative Court judgement59 regarding the  case of  a  Chechen woman 
claiming that because of the social situation in Chechnya, her social status as 
a single mother with a minor child places her within a social group of wom-
en in  the same situation. The Court did not share this line of argumentation 
and limited itself to the statement that being a single mother is not sufficient, 
as the claimant had not proved her membership to an organised group of single 
mothers in the country of origin. Conditioning the recognition for a particular 
social group on “membership in an organised group of women” proves a deep 
misunderstanding of  the concept. The Warsaw Administrative Court’s judge-
ment lacks not only references to any foreign case law but also to the Supreme 
Administrative Court judgement of 2008. The case law of  the Refugee Board 
is  not harmonious, either. Indeed, in  this kind of  cases the  judicial dialogue 
would undoubtedly contribute to a more uniform and foreseeable application 
of the binding law.
4.4. Applying the Internal Protection (Flight) Alternative 
Principle (‘the IPA principle’)
Another significant example of  judicial dialogue in  the context of  refugee 
law is  applying the  internal protection (flight) alternative (IPA) principle. This 
is a very important and current issue in the Polish practice of dealing with asy-
lum applications lodged by Ukrainians from Crimea under Russian occupation 
and from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Decisions taken by the Polish author-
ities in such cases are in vast majority negative exactly due to the application of the 
IPA principle. Thus, it is a decisive aspect of such cases.
The IPA was foreseen neither in the 1951 Geneva Convention nor in the 1967 
New York protocol, yet, it forms nowadays the  unquestionable part of  refugee 
law.60 Beyond the international refugee law the same mechanism is applied in the 
59 Case IV SA/Wa 1557/14 (Warsaw Administrative Court, 29 October 2014).
60 As it is stated in para. 91 of the UNHCR Handbook: “The fear of being persecuted need not 
always extend to the whole territory of the refugee’s country of nationality. Thus in ethnic 
clashes or in cases of grave disturbances involving civil war conditions, persecution of a spe-
cific ethnic or national group may occur in only one part of the country. In such situations, 
a person will not be excluded from refugee status merely because he could have sought ref-
uge in  another part of  the same country, if under all the  circumstances it would not have 
been reasonable to expect him to do so.” See also: UNHCR, Guidelines on International Pro-
tection No. 4: “Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative” within the Context of Article 1A(2) 
of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (23 July 2003) 
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general human rights law. For instance, the  ECtHR routinely engages the  IPA 
principle to adjudicate on cases regarding expulsion or other legal or factual 
forms of transfer of a foreigner to a third State where the foreigner’s rights would 
be endangered on the part of the territory only.61 Indeed, it was the case law of the 
ECtHR that has significantly contributed to the reliance on the internal relocation 
of persons in search of protection also in refugee law context, the CEAS includ-
ing. The IPA was directly foreseen in Art. 8 of the Qualification Directive of 2004, 
which was subsequently slightly modified in its recast version of 2011. It is explic-
itly transposed into Polish law in Art. 18 of the 2003 Act on granting protection 
to foreigners. Yet, one should remember that under Art. 8 of  the Qualification 
Directive the  IPA may be applied but the  Member States may choose to apply 
more favourable standards of treatment.
While applying the IPA at least four basic factors must be taken into account.62 
Firstly, before the IPA is applied, it must be first determined that a person con-
cerned would be at a risk of persecution or could suffer a serious harm on a part 
of a territory of a country of origin. Secondly, the IPA should not, in principle, be 
applied when the perpetrators are the authorities of the country of origin or they 
tolerate acts of persecution or serious harm. Thirdly, the safe parts of the country 
of  origin should be identified as precisely as possible. Finally, the  IPA applica-
tion requires the establishment of criteria for assessing the situation in safe parts 
of a country of origin and for answering the question as to whether conditions there 
safeguard access to effective protection. These are the criteria mentioned in last 
sentence of Art. 8(1) of the Qualification Directive according to which a person 
concerned can “safely and legally travel to and gain admittance to that [safe] part 
of the country and can reasonably be expected to settle there.” All that should be 
assessed, following Art. 8(2) of the Qualification Directive with “regard to the gen-
eral circumstances prevailing in that part of the country and to the personal cir-
cumstances of the applicant.”
As far as the  assessment of  Ukrainian applications by the  Polish authorities 
is concerned, the first two factors mentioned above are not problematic. In prin-
ciple, applicants from Crimea meet the  criteria to be granted refugee status 
HCR/GIP/03/04; The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative (11 April 1999) 
– Goodwin-Gill G.S., McAdam J. (n. 16) 123.
61 See: Chahal v the UK, App. No. 22414/93 (ECtHR, 15 November 1996). As far as the more re-
cent case law is concerned see e.g.: the illustrative cases referring to the changing situation 
in Somalia: Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, App. no. 1948/04 (ECtHR, 11 January 2007), Sufi 
and Elmi v the UK, App. nos 8319/07 and 11449/07 (ECtHR, 28 June 2011), K.A.B. v Sweden, 
App. no. 886/11 (ECtHR, 5 September 2013), R.H. v Sweden, App. no. 4601/14 (ECtHR, 10 Sep-
tember 2015).
62 For an extensive discussion, see: L. Aldenhoff, G. Clayton, P. McDonough, Actors of Protection 
and the Application of the Internal Protection Alternative. European Comparative Report (Euro-
pean Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2014), <http://www.ecre.org/component/downloads/
downloads/996.html> (access: 30 April 2016). Also: UNHCR, Guidelines on International Pro-
tection No. 4…, para. 7.
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and applicants from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions meet the criteria to be grant-
ed subsidiary protection due to the situations in the parts of the country of origin 
they come from. Also, it is beyond doubts that the sources of persecution or seri-
ous harm are not the Ukrainian authorities but other entities, be that Russian au-
thorities and/or non-State actors supported by the latter. Moreover, the Ukrainian 
authorities are unable to stop and prevent their activities. What remains challeng-
ing while applying the IPA to the Ukrainian applications are the two other factors 
and particularly the last of them – establishing the relevant criteria for assessment 
of actual accessibility of effective protection.63
Turning now to the question of judicial dialogue in the context of the IPA, 
it was already mentioned above that the  IPA references to national decisions 
may regard assessment of  factual situations in  particular countries of  origin, 
especially in their safe parts, and as such they have the character of the country 
of origin sources of  information. It was exactly the case of  the 2003 Supreme 
Administrative Court judgement and  the 2014 Refugee Board decision, both 
referred to in the subsection 4.2 above. However, the Polish references to for-
eign national decisions with regard to the normative framework of the IPA have 
not been identified.64 Nevertheless, in  the IPA cases, the  Polish decisions in-
clude frequent references to the UNHCR’s guidelines as well as sporadic ones to 
the ECtHR case law. The latter is the example of a reference of a national court 
to a decision of an international court as indicated above in point 1 of the sub-
section 3 of the present text.
The references to the ECtHR case law appeared in the cases in which the Ref-
ugee Board dealt with the appropriate standard of actual accessibility of effective 
protection. In one of such cases the decision of the Refugee Board was quashed 
by the Warsaw Administrative Court judgement due to the Refugee Board’s in-
adequate evidentiary findings on actual accessibility of protection in the safe part 
of Ukraine including access to employment, social benefits, medical and psycho-
logical care, educational opportunities and permanent housing as basic and in-
dispensible conditions safeguarding normal living.65 According to the Court, only 
63 This subsection is based on: M. Kowalski, ‘Konflikt na Ukrainie a praktyka udzielania ochrony 
cudzoziemcom na terytorium Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej’ [Ukrainian Conflict and the Practice 
of Granting Protection to Foreigners on the Territory of the Republic of Poland], [in:] D. Pud-
zianowska (ed.), Status cudzoziemca w Polsce w świetle współczesnych wyzwań międzynaro-
dowych [Foreigner’s Status in Poland in Light of the Contemporary International Challenges] 
(Wolters Kluwer 2016), p. 96. See there for an extensive analysis.
64 Even though it is  perfectly possible as shown by the  2008 Czech Supreme Administrative 
Court’s judgement. When considering the standards of the IPA application, the Court referred 
to the UNHCR guidelines and one ECtHR judgement (Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands). In ad-
dition, the Court also evoked the UK House of Lords judgement in Januzi, Hamid and others 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department of 15 February 2006; Judgement of the Supreme 
Administrative Court of the Czech Republic (Nejvyšší správní soud) of 24 January 2008, E. M. 
v Ministry of Interior, 4 Azs 99/2007-93. Extracts in English are available in refworld database.
65 Case IV SA/Wa 681/15 (Warsaw Administrative Court, 22 September 2015).
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if the mentioned conditions are fulfilled the actual accessibility of effective pro-
tection is safeguarded. Yet, the Refugee Board disregarded the Court’s position 
and appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court.66 In the reasoning support-
ing the appeal claim, the Refugee Board shared the Court approach that, while as-
sessing whether an applicant can reasonably be expected to settle in the safe part 
of the country of origin, apart from personal safety considerations also consider-
ations regarding the standard of living must be taken into account. Yet, the Ref-
ugee Board put into question the criteria the Warsaw Administrative Court ap-
plied for assessing whether expectations to settle in the safe part of the country 
of origin are  reasonable. According to the Refugee Board position, the Court’s 
approach was not to determine what would be the minimal standard allowing 
for a refugee to settle down, but what were the conditions for a general wellbeing 
of the person concerned.
The Refugee Board’s arguments in the appeal claim were directly influenced 
by the ECtHR case law. The Refugee Board presented its detailed analysis of the 
2011 ECtHR judgement in Sufi and Elmi in which the ECtHR stated, referring 
also to its previous case law, that “Article 3 [of the ECHR] does not preclude 
the Contracting States from placing reliance on the internal flight alternative 
provided that the returnee could travel to, gain admittance to and settle in the 
area in  question without being exposed to a  real risk of  Article 3 ill-treat-
ment”67 and that such ill-treatment may in exceptional cases result also from 
socio-economic and  humanitarian conditions, if grounds against removal 
are ‘compelling’. The Refugee Board referred to the ECtHR position as far as it 
conditioned the applicability of the IPA on determinations made with the help 
of the test established in the N. v the UK (compelling humanitarian grounds68) 
or of the test established in the M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (official indiffer-
ence in a  situation of  serious deprivation or want incompatible with human 
dignity69). It must be noted that the choice of the relevant test was dependant 
on the sources of the insufficient humanitarian situation. The Refugee Board 
quoted the ECtHR position that the N. case test was appropriate if extreme-
ly dire humanitarian conditions resulted exclusively or mainly from pover-
ty or lack of resources following a naturally occurring phenomenon, such as 
a drought. Yet, in circumstances in which dire humanitarian conditions ema-
nate not only from poverty and naturally occurring phenomena but also from 
direct and indirect actions of the parties of the conflict (as it was the case in So-
malia and evaluated in in Sufi and Elmi), the ECtHR accepted the M.S.S. test 
as more appropriate. Taking this into account the  Refugee Board concluded 
66 The  cassation complaint (skarga kasacyjna) of  the Refugee Board against the  Warsaw Ad-
ministrative Court judgement of 22 September 2015 in case IV SA/Wa 681/15 (Refugee Board, 
7 January 2016) unpublished and on file with the author.
67 Sufi and Elmi (n. 62), para. 294.
68 N. v the UK, App. no. 26565/05 (ECtHR, 27 May 2008), paras 42 and 43.
69 M.S.S., para. 253.
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that the condition of a safe settlement option in a part of a country of origin 
free from the risk of persecution or serious harm and including the reasonable 
settlement criterion, in case of  the situation in Ukraine should be perceived 
in  the way that unless compelling humanitarian grounds regarding the  pre-
vailing circumstances in the safe part of Ukraine or individual circumstances 
of the person concerned existed and in consequence excluded the settlement 
option, the IPA might be applied.
The above example was an interesting effort aimed at harmonisation of the 
case law of the Polish refugee status determination authorities and administra-
tive courts based on the case law of the ECtHR. In this respect it would be a true 
example of proper judicial dialogue. Yet, the effort appeared to be unsuccessful 
as the appeal claim was rejected on purely procedural grounds. It is very unfor-
tunate indeed, as the case law of the Polish authorities remains highly diversi-
fied within the analysed scope. In another Ukrainian case – which was almost 
identical to that mentioned above –  the Warsaw Administrative Court shared 
the reasoning of the Refugee Board and dismissed the appeal. It stated, among 
others, that it
shares the  position formulated by the  [ECtHR] in  the cases referred to by [the Refugee 
Board] […] in  which it was accepted that States are  obliged not to expel foreigners only 
in situation in which extreme poverty is predicted, when the foreigner concerned is a person 
wholly dependent on State support and he or she is faced with official indifference of his or 
her State’s authorities which is incompatible with human dignity. It is about the living condi-
tions in the place of relocation that are so bad that the foreigner’s existence, his or her life as 
well as his or her health (understood as the need to safeguard the basic medical care) may be 
endangered to such a degree that it actually results in a necessity to return the territory where 
the risk of persecution exists.70
However, it should be stressed that in numerous other decisions of the Refu-
gee Board dealing with the IPA principle application and especially in the context 
of the appropriate standard of the actual accessibility of effective protection, there 
are no references whatsoever to the case law of the ECtHR. Instead, the numerous 
references may be identified to the UNHCR guidelines and to the ‘reasonableness’ 
70 “Podziela stanowisko sformułowane przez Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka w powoła-
nych przez organ wyrokach […], w których uznano, iż państwa mają obowiązek powstrzy-
mania  się od  wydalania cudzoziemców jedynie w  sytuacji prognozy skrajnego ubóstwa, 
gdy cudzoziemiec jest osobą całkowicie zależną od pomocy państwa i znalazł się w obliczu 
obojętności organów swojego państwa, nie do  pogodzenia z  godnością człowieka. Chodzi 
tu o warunki życia w miejscu relokacji na tyle złe, że egzystencja cudzoziemca, jego życie, 
a także zdrowie (rozumiane jako potrzeba zapewnienia mu podstawowej opieki medycznej) 
może być na tyle zagrożona, iż realnie skutkuje koniecznością powrotu na teren, na którym 
istnieje zagrożenie prześladowaniem”, case IV SA/Wa 694/15 (Warsaw Administrative Court, 
24 September 2015).
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test. According to this test it is required to determine whether in the relocation re-
gion the person concerned may lead ‘a relatively normal life’ without undue hard-
ship.71 This is  the dominant position adopted by the Refugee Board, which has 
been also approved in the case law of the administrative courts.
4.5. Granting Subsidiary Protection and the Denial of Access 
to Adequate Medical Treatment
The consideration of the relationship between the subsidiary protection when 
an applicant is in need of an adequate medical treatment is the subject of another 
bulk of case law exemplifying the judicial dialogue in the Polish context. In these 
particular cases if an applicant is  denied protection, his suffering is  caused by 
the  lack of  access to the  adequate medical treatment. Another problem that 
is worth analysing in  the context of  the judicial dialogue on refugee law is  the 
question of granting international protection to the seriously ill in case their re-
turn to the country of origin would cause their suffering due to the lack of access 
to adequate medical care and the necessary treatment. Of course, in a situation 
in  which the  denial of  access to adequate medical treatment would be inten-
tional due to one of the reasons enumerated in the refugee definition the person 
concerned would meet the criteria to be granted refugee status. Such situations 
are extremely rare though. The situations which are much more frequent are the 
ones in which a seriously ill foreigner would be deprived of the adequate medical 
treatment in case of return to his or her country of origin because of poor health 
system there resulting in no access to particular medical treatment. This is  the 
frequent case of persons with HIV and AIDS-related conditions coming from nu-
merous African States in which the health systems do not guarantee an adequate 
(or any) treatment.
Yet, the persons concerned could be, as it seems, covered by subsidiary pro-
tection under Art. 15(b) of  the Qualification Directive, which defines the risk 
of  serious harm consisting of  torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment of an applicant in the country of origin. Thus, this provision direct-
ly corresponds with the prohibition of Art. 3 ECHR. According to the ECtHR, 
in exceptional cases the removal of the ill foreigner to his or her country of origin 
may constitute a violation of Art. 3 ECHR and, therefore, cannot be executed. For 
the first time the ECtHR decided so in the famous 1997 judgment D. v the UK72 
and subsequently established a de facto precedent in the 2008 N. v the UK Grand 
Chamber judgement where it determined a very high threshold of ‘compelling 
humanitarian grounds’ as the only exceptional situation in which the removal 
is  to be excluded. Indeed, this is a very restrictive standard and as such it has 
71 See e.g. Refugee Board cases: RdU-956-1/S/15 (22 April 2016); RdU-588-2/S/15 (17 March 
2016); RdU-560-2/S/15 (4 December 2015).
72 D. v the UK, App. no. 30240/96 (ECtHR, 2 May 1997).
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been under a harsh critique in  the doctrine and by the non-governmental or-
ganisations. Also, it is  characteristic that the  N. standard has been criticised 
within the ECtHR itself and numerous judges expressed their calls for the lib-
eralisation of the standard in diversified separate opinions annexed the ECtHR 
judgements.73 Nevertheless the N. standard remains to be applied by the ECtHR. 
It should be noted, however, that the standard offers some flexibility in appli-
cation of the ‘compelling humanitarian grounds’ standard to the circumstances 
of  a  particular case. It  is especially so in  case of  national authorities making 
the relevant decisions.
In the  Polish practice on granting international protection it was exactly 
the N. standard, which formed the reference point in applying Art. 15(2) of Act on 
granting protection to foreigners, which is an exact equivalent of Art. 15(b) of the 
2011 Qualification Directive. In rare cases did the Refugee Board explicitly refer 
to the  ECtHR case law establishing the  relevant interpretation of  Art.  3 ECHR 
and granted subsidiary protection to a seriously ill applicant. An illustrative ex-
ample of such decision is a case of a young female applicant from Sudan who was 
very seriously ill, including being HIV positive, was an orphan and presumable 
was a victim of trafficking in human beings. When granting subsidiary protection 
to the person concerned, the Refugee Board stated that:
in the case exceptional and compelling humanitarian grounds occur, in the light of which 
the applicant would be denied the very basic medical care in the country of origin and that 
would result in placing her in danger of suffering of such a degree of mistreatment that it 
meets the criteria for endangering the applicant for serious harm consisting in inhuman or 
degrading treatment.74
The Refugee Board decision included the  explicit references to both 
the D. and the N. judgements of the ECtHR.
In December 2014 the question of interpretation of Art. 15(b) of the 2004 Qual-
ification Directive (yet it is relevant for the 2011 recast version as well) was decid-
ed by the CJEU in M’Bodj case. The CJEU considered the preliminary questions 
of  the Belgian court and  provided an explanation as to the  scope of  subsidiary 
protection under Art. 15(b) of the 2004 Qualification limiting in a radical manner 
73 Opinion partiellement concordante commune aux Juges Tulkens, Jočienė, Popović, Karakaş, 
Raimondi et Pinto de Albuqerque, Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v Belgium, App. no. 10486/10 (ECtHR, 
20  December 2011); Concurring opinion of  Judge Lemmens joined by Judge Nussberger 
and  Dissenting opinion of  Judge Power-Forde, S.J. v  Belgium, App. no. 70055/10 (ECtHR, 
27 February 2014, Chamber), Dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuqerque, S.J. v Bel-
gium, App. no. 70055/10 (ECtHR, 15 March 2015, Grand Chamber).
74 “W sprawie zachodzą wyjątkowe i nieodparte okoliczności humanitarne, w świetle których 
wnioskodawczyni byłaby w kraju pochodzenia pozbawiona podstawowej opieki medycznej, 
co narażałoby ją na cierpienia o takim stopniu dolegliwości, że spełniają one znamiona do-
znania przez wnioskodawczynię poważnej krzywdy przez narażenie jej na nieludzkie lub po-
niżające traktowania”, case RdU-246-1/S/13 (Refugee Board, 29 August 2013).
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the possibility of granting this form of international protection to the seriously ill. 
The CJEU referred directly to the judgement of the ECtHR in the N. case and to 
the standard established there.75 Against these pronouncements, it stated that
none the less, the fact that a third country national suffering from a serious illness may not, 
under Article 3 ECHR as interpreted by the  [ECtHR], in highly exceptional cases, be re-
moved to a country in which appropriate treatment is not available does not mean that that 
person should be granted leave to reside in a Member State by way of subsidiary protection 
under Directive 2004/83. In  the light of  the foregoing, Article 15(b) of Directive 2004/83 
must be interpreted as meaning that serious harm, as defined by the directive, does not cover 
a situation in which inhuman or degrading treatment, such as that referred to by the legisla-
tion at issue in the main proceedings, to which an applicant suffering from a serious illness 
may be subjected if returned to his country of origin, is the result of the fact that appropriate 
treatment is not available in that country, unless such an applicant is intentionally deprived 
of health care.76
What is more, the CJEU explicitly stated that the Member States are not en-
titled to introduce or to retain more favourable standards in this respect because 
“it would be contrary to the general scheme and objectives of Directive 2004/83 
to grant refugee status and subsidiary protection status to third country nationals 
in situations which have no connection with the rationale of international protec-
tion.”77
Consequently, the  M’Bodj judgement, in  fact, excluded granting subsidiary 
protection to the seriously ill foreigners, save the situations in which they would be 
intentionally deprived of health care. Such restriction will also apply to those who 
must not be removed due to the guarantees under Art. 3 ECHR. Such restrictive 
interpretation of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment under Art. 15(b) of the 
Qualification Directive vis-à-vis the ECtHR interpretation of Art. 3 ECHR seems 
to be arbitral and thus doubtful. One has to remember however, that at the very 
same day as the  M’Bodj judgement was delivered the  CJEU delivered another 
judgement in case of Abdida,78 in which it confirmed other guarantees under EU 
law for the persons concerned on the basis of the Return Directive. Thus, the CJEU 
reasoning on the Return Directive, as described vividly by Steve Peers described, 
“transforms an instrument of repression into (in some cases) an instrument for 
protection.”79 The line of the CJEU argumentation perceived jointly in both cases 
75 M’Bodj (n. 48), para. 39.
76 Ibidem, paras 40–41.
77 Ibidem, para. 44.
78 Case C-562/13 Centre public d’action sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve v  Moussa Abdida 
(CJEU, 18 December 2014).
79 S. Peers, ‘Could EU law save Paddington Bear? The CJEU develops a new type of protection’ 
(EU Law Analysis, 21 December 2014), <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk> (access: 30 April 
2016).
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may be assessed as surprising and deserves a separate analysis exceeding the scope 
of the present text.
The CJEU position has been rapidly taken into account and referred to in the 
Polish practice. This may be labelled as the rapid appropriation of  the outcome 
of the European judicial dialogue to the domestic level. The Warsaw Administra-
tive Court judgement of 22 January 201580 (so delivered slightly over one month 
after the M’Bodj and Abdida judgements) is especially worth attention. The Court 
referred to both of the judgements directly. It started rather surprisingly with ref-
erences to the Abdida judgement, which were completely irrelevant for the case 
and subsequently referred to paragraphs 39–41 of the M’Bodj judgement and stat-
ed that it precluded granting subsidiary protection to the  claimant concerned. 
The position of the CJEU with direct references to paragraphs 40–41 of the M’Bodj 
judgement is also included in the decisions of the Refugee Board refusing to grant 
subsidiary protection unless an applicant is intentionally deprived of health care.81 
Thus, the question of granting the persons concerned other forms of protection 
will be decided in separate return procedure. However, those to whom the protec-
tion was granted (they could be granted the humanitarian stay permit or tolerated 
stay permit under the 2013 Act on foreigners82) will enjoy a significantly less fa-
vourable status – especially, but not exclusively, as social conditions are concerned 
– vis-à-vis those enjoying subsidiary protection. 
Undoubtedly, the question under analysis will continue to be the subject of the 
European judicial dialogue. It has been already heralded by the dissenting opinion 
of the ECtHR Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque annexed to the S.J. judgement 
of 2015, in which he criticised sharply the CJEU judgements in M’Bodj and Abdi-
da and concluded that “the messy state of the European case law, with its flagrant 
internal contradictions, makes it even more urgent to review the standard set out 
in N. in the light of international refugee law and international migration law.”83
5. Conclusion
The Polish contribution to judicial dialogue on refugee law is rather modest 
and definitely could be more elaborate. It especially involves the almost non-ex-
isting cross-citations and  references to the  case law of  foreign national courts. 
At the  same time, the  potential to exchange arguments in  this way in  order to 
reach common understandings of refugee law concepts and mechanisms is high 
80 Case IV SA/Wa 2152/14 (Warsaw Administrative Court, 22 January 2015).
81 See e.g. Refugee Board cases: RdU-1109-1/S/15 (7 April 2016); RdU-550-3/S/14 (22 April 2016).
82 Journal of Laws 2013, item 1650, as amended.
83 Dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, S.J. (2015), para. 5.
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and  should not be neglected. Also, beyond judicial dialogue understood as 
cross-citation, informal ways of courts’ interaction should not be underestimated, 
as they may be very influential. For obvious reasons they are very difficult to trace.
Due to the Europeanization of the refugee law the references in the Polish case 
law to the decisions of both the ECtHR and the CJEU are more frequent and to 
some extent remain mandatory. In  this regard the  growing importance of  the 
CJEU case law is of highest significance. However, its influence may be perceived 
– at least to some extent – as controversial as was demonstrated in the analysed 
example of the M’Bodj case. This is also an illustrative example of the influence 
of the European courts’ judicial dialogue on national case law.
Finally, one more aspect deserves to be brought up. The analysis conducted also 
shows that the references to both foreign national courts’ and international courts’ 
case laws are more frequent and in principle more detailed in the case law of the 
Refugee Board than in the case law of the administrative courts. It may be claimed 
that it is so because the Refugee Board is the specialised body dedicated to adjudi-
cate refugee law cases only, whereas the administrative courts are not specialised 
in this respect and act within general judicial review of public administration. One 
may claim that this might be an additional argument for the need of  reshaping 
the Polish national institutional framework and for establishing a specialised court 
or tribunal for refugees or – more broadly – for the law on foreigners’ matters.
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